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THE AMBIGUITY IN SCHOPENHAUER’S DOCTRINE 
OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF 
 VASFI ONUR ÖZEN 
THE GENERAL ATTITUDE toward Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is 
rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the 
figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and 
contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotif among scholars. Julian 
Young describes Schopenhauer as “a stubborn personality unwilling to 
admit that the central claim of his philosophy—that the will is the thing-
in-itself—rests on a fundamental error.” 1  In his preface to Self and 
World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Christopher Janaway remarks, 
Only a proper appraisal of the context in which, and the aims with 
which, Schopenhauer was arguing can bring out the true 
philosophical interest in studying him. That his metaphysics is 
flawed . . . does not detract from his historical importance or from 
the worth of the problems he raises.2  
It has to be pointed out that as a result of this prevailing tendency many 
have become accustomed to treating Schopenhauer’s philosophy as in 
need of substantial correction and reconstruction. In this paper, I 
especially take issue with certain interpretive routes that have been 
taken in Schopenhauer scholarship concerning his metaphysical 
system. In my view, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics still deserves serious 
consideration and understanding rather than correction or rebuke. I 
also think that the history of philosophy is at its best when it is not 
guided by our preconceptions. Therefore, I am solely interested in 
examining what Schopenhauer has to say about the thing-in-itself and 
developing an account that does not go beyond what he is stating. That 
being said, my interpretative attitude is perhaps best reflected in Georg 
Simmel’s words: 
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1 Julian Young, Schopenhauer (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98. 
2  Christopher Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), viii. 
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The total philosophy of Schopenhauer is a way to the thing-in-itself. 
For Schopenhauer, it was certainly not the case that the concept of 
thing-in-itself had created a problem by offering an empty schema 
which had to be given flesh. Such would be the approach of an 
epigone or of someone who had merely flung the toga of philosophy 
around himself. Schopenhauer was a philosopher at heart, who from 
the first had a characteristic world-sentiment shaped by its direction 
toward absolute being, toward the simple totality of the manifold of 
things.3 
Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will 
continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it 
presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. 4 
Schopenhauer borrows the term “thing-in-itself” from Immanuel Kant, 
who uses it to refer to a reality that is distinct from what appears to us 
and hence unknowable.5 Despite the fact that several interpretations 
                                                     
3 Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. Helmut Loiskandl, 
Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1991), 16. 
4 The following abbreviations are used for Schopenhauer’s works: The 
World as Will and Representation [WWR], vols. 1 and 2, trans. Eric F.J. Payne 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1966). Citations to the first volume of WWR are 
to volume, section, and page numbers, and those to the second are to volume 
and page numbers; Parerga and Paralipomena [PP], vols. 1 and 2, trans. Eric 
F.J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Citations to PP are given first with 
the volume number and the section number; Gesammelte Briefe [GB], ed. 
Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1978). All 
references to GB are to letter numbers and to the translation by John E. Atwell; 
Manuscript Remains [MR], in four volumes, trans. Eric F. J. Payne (New York: 
Berg Publishers Limited, 1988). Citations to MR are given first with the volume 
number and the section number; Sämtliche Werke [Werke], vols. 2 and 3, ed. by 
Arthur Hübscher (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988). Citations to Werke are to 
volume and page numbers; On the Will in Nature [WN], trans. Eric F.J. Payne 
(New York: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1992). Citations to WN include the chapter 
title and the page number; On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason [FR], trans. Eric F. J. Payne (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1997). Citations 
to FR include the section number; Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will [FW], 
trans. Eric F. J. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Citations to FW are given with the chapter number and the page number. 
5 For references to Kant’s work, I cite the page numbers in the original 
first (A) and second (B) editions: Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul 
Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Without going into the exegetical details, Kant has been interpreted as either 
espousing a “two worlds” or “two aspects” metaphysical view. According to the 
two-worlds interpretation, the thing-in-itself and the thing as it appears are 
ontologically distinct, unrelated entities, whereas, according to the two-aspects 
interpretation, they are not ontologically distinct from each other. On the latter 
SCHOPENHAUER’S DOCTRINE OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF 253 
have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the 
thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how 
to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term 
“thing-in-itself.” The proposed interpretations fall under two main 
categories: those who recognize a change of heart by Schopenhauer 
from his earlier views on the thing-in-itself6 and those who do not.7  
I agree with the first group of interpreters that there are noteworthy 
changes in Schopenhauer’s views. The gist of their discussion seems 
implicitly to suggest that there are two stages in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy: the first stage, where the young Schopenhauer identifies the 
thing-in-itself with the will, and a later second stage, where he takes a 
less stringent stance by qualifying his use of the term “thing-in-itself.” I 
do not believe, however, that one can trace clear-cut stages in his 
philosophical development given Schopenhauer’s simultaneous 
adherence to views that are seemingly contradictory and incompatible 
in nature. My interpretation significantly differs from that of the first 
and second group of interpreters insofar as they either entirely omit or 
overlook those changes in Schopenhauer’s thinking as greatly affecting 
the internal consistency of his position. Unlike the other interpretations, 
the interpretation I offer here distinguishes three distinct and mutually 
incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-
itself. I believe any attempt to give a coherent, consistent account of 
Schopenhauer’s thought as a whole is inevitably bound to encounter 
                                                     
view, which is more in line with Schopenhauer’s position, the thing-in-itself and 
appearances are treated as one and the same, only considered from two 
different points of view. In Schopenhauer’s words, “every being in nature is 
simultaneously phenomenon and thing-in-itself.” PP 2, §63. To illustrate this, I 
perceive myself, my body, as a material/empirical object, just a representation 
among many other representations. But I also recognize that my “body occurs 
in [my] consciousness in quite another way, toto genere different . . . not as 
representation, but as something over and above this, hence what it is in itself.” 
WWR 1, §19, 103. 
6 Most prominently, John E. Atwell, Schopenhauer and the Character of 
the World: The Metaphysics of the Will (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995); David E. Cartwright, “Two Senses of ‘Thing-in-itself’ in 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,” Idealistic Studies 31, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 31–54; 
Moira Nicholls, “The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s 
Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Schopenhauer, ed. Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 171–212; Julian Young, Schopenhauer. 
7 Most recently, Sandra Shapshay, “Poetic Intuition and the Bounds of 
Sense: Metaphor and Metonymy in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (July 2008): 211–29. 
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difficulties because Schopenhauer’s writings are riddled with 
irreconcilable passages concerning the thing-in-itself. This is why, I 
suggest, Schopenhauer’s multiple contrary views about the thing-in-
itself leave any effort to reconcile them and reach a univocal 
representation of his thought a doomed task. 
I separate out these apparently contrary views as follows. The first 
view, whose first formulation dates to 1815, is the most readily 
recognized, in which Schopenhauer refuses to ascribe a separate and 
distinct reality to the thing-in-itself and disagrees with Kant that the 
thing-in-itself is beyond human apprehension. On the contrary, he 
alleges that we all recognize the thing-in-itself immediately in the inner 
perception of our own will, which depends neither on any conceptual 
determination, nor on structured representations of the world of 
appearances. Schopenhauer then notoriously declares that the thing-in-
itself is the will. The second view is somewhat subtler and for that 
matter rather more difficult to grasp: sometime during the period 1820–
21, Schopenhauer begins to doubt that the thing-in-itself is accessible to 
the mind. Sensing the implausibility of identifying the thing-in-itself as 
the will, he seems to backpedal and admits that the will, strictly 
speaking, is not the thing-in-itself but instead the most distinct 
phenomenal appearance of it. He modifies his claim by saying that he 
only names the thing-in-itself after its most distinct (or closest) 
appearance. Beyond these views, it is possible to derive even a third 
view, according to which it is no longer the immediate experience of 
one’s own willing but, rather, withdrawal from the will-to-life that 
awakens in one a realization of the inner essence, the in-itself, of all 
being. While this third strand contradicts Schopenhauer’s previous 
understandings of the thing-in-itself, it evinces the apparently Kantian 
bent of his later writings. At times in his later writings, Schopenhauer 
seems reluctant to make any claim whatsoever about the thing-in-itself 
or its relation to the phenomenal world. He concedes that a 
nonphenomenal reality can be conceived only negatively, as “that to 
which the denial of the will-to-live opens the way.”8 
There are basically two ways to deal with this interpretative 
challenge that do not in any obvious way suggest “the unfolding of a 
single thought” in Schopenhauer’s work.9 One can continue to try to 
                                                     
8 PP 2, §144. 
9 WWR 1, §53, 285. 
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solve the puzzling identification of the thing-in-itself with the will. 
Alternatively, one can attempt to understand the meaning and extent of 
these apparent shifts in Schopenhauer’s thinking. I will go with the 
second approach and show that the differences in Schopenhauer’s 
views about the thing-in-itself and the will can be interpreted only in 
terms of his increasing emphasis on ascetic ideals of suffering and 
worldly withdrawal in his later writings. This is a point that has been 
steadily neglected by commentators up to this day. 
Now, the first question to be addressed is: “Are these three 
accounts perhaps representing the different stages in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical development?” As R. Raj Singh points out, the main 
problem with the suggestion of multiple stages in his thought is that 
Schopenhauer regarded the first edition of WWR as the ultimate and 
complete metaphysical system, to which the rest of his works are a 
series of footnotes. That is why he refers to the subsequent additions to 
this work, constituting Volume 2, simply as “supplements” 
(Ergänzungen). As a matter of fact, his later works other than WWR are 
just further elaborations of the original statement of his worldview.10 
Thus, any thesis about different stages in Schopenhauer’s thought is 
outright false and unconvincing—just the idea of it is “enough to make 
Schopenhauer turn in his grave.”11 I believe, however, with the first 
group of interpreters, that it is highly contentious to claim that there is 
no indication of any change in Schopenhauer’s views. The real difficulty 
lies in the fact that Schopenhauer himself never explicitly 
acknowledged his change of views about the thing-in-itself and its 
relation to the will. Moreover, he was not so effective in dispelling the 
ambiguity in his understanding of the term “thing-in-itself” and 
apparently remained committed to incompatible views. To illustrate this 
with an example: In one place in the second volume of Parerga and 
Paralipomena, published in 1851 (nine years before his death), 
Schopenhauer claims, in line with the first view, that for Kant the thing-
                                                     
10  R. Raj Singh, Death, Contemplation and Schopenhauer (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2007), 59. 
11  Ibid., 58. Here Singh is particularly taking issue with Nicholls’s 
interpretation: “In response to Nicholls’ interpretations it might be said at the 
outset that there are no shifts in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the thing-in-itself.” 
Ibid., 59. 
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in-itself “was an x; for me it is will.”12 Yet in another passage in the same 
text, he characterizes the thing-in-itself as that which remains outside 
of the will and its manifestation, which reflects the third view but 
remains at odds with the first view. 13  Therefore, we simply cannot 
understand Schopenhauer’s views on the nature of the thing-in-itself as 
going through different stages. 
The question that follows directly is: “How are these three accounts 
to be reconciled?” Unfortunately, there is no easy answer. Although 
Schopenhauer formulated different views on the thing-in-itself and, as a 
result, came considerably closer to Kant’s stance on the unknowability 
of the thing-in-itself, till the very end, he remained faithful to the idea 
that the thing-in-itself is the will. One may say Schopenhauer was 
ambiguous to the point of blatant self-contradiction. On the one hand, 
he prided himself on aspiring to the ideal of consistency, claiming that 
his philosophy is “the unfolding of a single thought.”14 On the other, he 
made claims that, taken together and in context, hardly form an 
expression of a single thought. And he admitted that he “was never 
concerned about the harmony and agreement of my propositions, not 
even when some of them seemed to me to be inconsistent.” 15 
Schopenhauer was aware of the difficulty of holding fast to a single 
thought, and therefore, he at times deviated from it, switching from one 
view to another, with no concern for consistency. It is not at all clear 
whether these three accounts are merely different ways of describing 
the same underlying reality. Therefore, I suggest, it is better to embrace 
the ambiguity in Schopenhauer’s understanding of the thing-in-itself and 
accept that these three accounts are to be primarily understood as 
incompatible views Schopenhauer happens to hold simultaneously. 
I will examine each of these views in more detail in the next three 
sections and show why the existing interpretations, while impressive in 
their ingenuity, are ultimately unsatisfactory in that they vainly attempt 
and fail to integrate Schopenhauer’s views about the thing-in-itself and 
the will into a tight-knit, coherent philosophical system. Although I 
make no claims for a strict periodization of Schopenhauer’s career into 
stages, I will demonstrate that Schopenhauer developed these three 
views throughout his career in the order given above. I will show that it 
                                                     
12 PP 2, §61. 
13 PP 2, §144. 
14 WWR 1, §53, 285. 
15 PP 1, “Fragments for the History of Philosophy,” §14. 
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is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of 
Schopenhauer’s position but also not worth trying, because such an 
endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth 
of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer. In the final section of the 
paper, I will focus my attention on how Schopenhauer employs 
essentially a Fichtean strategy to approach the problem of the thing-in-
itself. In concluding my analysis, I will briefly speculate on whether we 
can understand these three accounts as contrasting but not 
contradictory views, in other words, as different perspectives on the 
same reality. 
I 
In the first edition of The World as Will and Representation, 
published in 1818, Schopenhauer vehemently denies the notion of the 
thing-in-itself as signifying a reality independent of our thoughts and 
experiences and asserts that this world as known by us has only two 
sides: first and foremost, the world as will and, second, the world as 
representation. Schopenhauer cautiously emphasizes that “a reality that 
is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which also Kant’s 
thing-in-itself has unfortunately degenerated in his hands), is the 
phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in 
philosophy.”16 Here the basic idea is that we can grasp the meaning or 
sense of an object only in its relation to a knowing subject. Subject and 
object necessarily presuppose one another: they “are inseparable even 
in thought, for each of the two has meaning and existence only through 
and for the other; each exists with the other and vanishes with it.”17 
Therefore, a reality to which the mind has no access, in other words, an 
object-in-itself, is simply inconceivable, the phantom of a dream. 
Later in the same work, Schopenhauer repeats his contention that 
the notion of an in-itself, apart from the will and the representation, does 
not add an iota to our knowledge, and hence such an existence is 
pronounced inconceivable and meaningless. If this material world that 
we know as our mere representation has an in-itself aspect, we can find 
                                                     
16 WWR 1, §1, 4. 
17 WWR 1, §2, 5. 
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that only immediately in ourselves as the will. 18  According to 
Schopenhauer, the experienced external world, as exhibiting itself in 
time and space and as adhering to the law of causality, is a mere 
representation of our intellect. It is only in an allegedly 
nonrepresentational kind of experience of our own will that we gain an 
immediate insight into the in-itself of this phenomenal world. If one 
accepts this dualistic vision of reality, then the question of the thing-in-
itself dissolves. For Schopenhauer, to the question “What is the thing-in-
itself?” “Our answer has been the will.”19 Or, as Schopenhauer in an 1815 
notebook entry more forcefully expresses it, “[t]he will is Kant’s thing-
in-itself.”20 Schopenhauer asserted this bold claim several times in his 
later published works, such as his 1835 On the Will in Nature: “Kant’s 
‘thing-in-itself’, or the ultimate substratum of every phenomenon, is the 
will.”21 
But it remains doubtful whether the Schopenhauer of the first 
edition of WWR really took himself to have succeeded in putting an end 
to the question of the thing-in-itself. No analysis or (causal) explanation 
can be applied to further our understanding of that which is given 
merely in the form of the inner sense, in other words, of the immediate 
intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. According to Dale 
Jacquette, for Schopenhauer, “[w]e cannot explain thing-in-itself, but 
only arrive intuitively at the insight that thing-in-itself is Will.”22 But how 
could we have insight into the nature of a reality that is beyond the 
forms of intuition? Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself 
with the will is deeply problematic. On the one hand, he seems to affirm 
the nonspatial, nontemporal nature of the thing-in-itself. On the other, 
he defines its nature as the will, thereby identifying the thing-in-itself as 
a temporal phenomenon accessible to consciousness. This is 
implausible in that no temporal phenomenon can be identical to the 
thing-in-itself. 
                                                     
18 WWR 1, §19, 105. 
19 WWR 1, §24, 120. 
20 MR 1, §442. 
21 WN, “Comparative Anatomy,” 47. 
22 Dale Jacquette, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2005), 85. 
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II 
Almost all major interpretations of Schopenhauer to date agree 
that, over the years, Schopenhauer’s assertive tone mellowed, and that 
he began to suspend, or at least develop a critical distance from, the 
central claim of the first edition of WWR. As early as the first edition of 
WWR, Schopenhauer already begins to recognize that “I know my will . 
. . not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, 
and hence in time.”23 However, he faces the issue more acutely in his 
1820–21 Berlin manuscripts, noting that “[t]he will, as we perceive it in 
ourselves, is not the thing-in-itself, for it only shows itself in individual 
and successive acts of will; these have time as their form and therefore 
are already a phenomenon.”24  
This critical awareness became more visible later on, with the 
publication of the second edition of WWR in 1844 (twenty-six years after 
the first edition), where Schopenhauer makes an explicit concession on 
the issue of the thing-in-itself. He admits to his readers that the inner 
observation of our own will “still does not by any means furnish an 
exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself; [it] would do 
so if it were a wholly immediate [ganz unmittelbare] observation.”25 The 
admission that the immediate knowledge of one’s own being is not 
“wholly immediate” appears to be a rejection, or at least a softening, of 
the assertive claim that the thing-in-itself is the will.26 
To fully grasp how exactly it softens the force of Schopenhauer’s 
central claim, it is necessary to have an understanding of the notion of 
“wholly immediate experience.” Schopenhauer’s above remarks, 
together with the insights provided in §19 of his 1813 dissertation, 
                                                     
23 WWR 1, §18, 101. 
24 MR 3, §98. 
25  Werke 2, 254/WWR 2, 196. In §19 of his 1813 dissertation, FR, 
Schopenhauer elaborates on the immediacy of the representations of inner 
sense. 
26 In my estimation Robert Wicks comes close to the truth when he states, 
“It is possible to read Schopenhauer in a more Kantian way, as someone who 
denies that we can know anything absolutely about the thing-in-itself. By these 
lights, his claim that the thing-in-itself is Will requires some considerable 
softening, but some of Schopenhauer’s passages indeed sound very Kantian.” 
Robert Wicks, Schopenhauer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 67. 
However, he ultimately rejects the possibility of a strictly Kantian reading of 
Schopenhauer. For the details of my disagreement with Wicks, see my n. 52 
below. 
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suggest that the disjunction of the following conditions provides both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for any experience to count as 
“wholly immediate”:  
(i) The experience in question is unconditioned by any subjective 
forms of representation, namely, space, time, as well as causality. 
(ii) It does not fall under the subject–object distinction.  
However, concerning the relation between (i) and (ii), one might 
wonder whether (ii) is somewhat redundant. Is (ii) another way of 
stating (i)? And if so, then why is there a need to present them as two 
separate conditions? According to Schopenhauer, because everything is 
given to us in the subjective forms of representation only, we can never 
overcome the subject–object distinction. Something becomes 
comprehensible only through representation, through the 
correspondence between what is subjective and what is objective. In 
other words, there is no knower without a known as its object, no 
knowing without representing. My knowledge that “there is a round 
steel canteen right in front of my eyes” is my subjective mental 
representation of that object, that is, a canteen, which is something 
external to my mind. Although (ii) seems to be philosophically 
redundant, it is still useful to present (i) and (ii) as two separate 
conditions insofar as Schopenhauer’s language at times suggests that (i) 
and (ii) are distinct conditions. Specifically, on the one hand, he speaks 
in terms of subjective forms pointing out that the knowledge one has of 
one’s own will is still subject to the form of representation, that is, time. 
On the other hand, he also notes that even in the most immediate 
consciousness of one’s own being, the subject, as knower or intellect, is 
confronted with an object that slips from any conceptual grasp (that is, 
the will): “there still remains the form of time, as well as that of being 
known and of knowing in general.”27 The consciousness we have of our 
own bodily experiencing is still “tied to the form of representation; it is 
perception or observation.”28 The will may be arguably free from the 
forms of space and causality, but “there still remains the form of time.”29 
                                                     
27 WWR 2, 197. 
28 WWR 2, 196. 
29 WWR 2, 197. 
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It is something known to us most immediately, yet not wholly 
immediately.30 
Young points out that “to the youthful Schopenhauer this would 
count as an admission of defeat, of the failure of the task of philosophy, 
that of uncovering the ultimate ‘whatness’ of reality, of cracking the 
problem of the Kantian thing in itself.”31 Here it should be noted that 
Young’s attempt at periodizing Schopenhauer’s intellectual 
development is misguided from a scholarly viewpoint because, strictly 
speaking, there is no textual evidence supporting the distinction 
between young and mature Schopenhauer, despite the changes in his 
position toward the Kantian “thing-in-itself” over the years. 
There has been a valiant attempt to rescue Schopenhauer from the 
contradiction of claiming that the thing-in-itself is the will. One group of 
commentators32 proposes that he employs two different conceptions of 
the thing-in-itself in his philosophy: the thing in itself “in its relation to 
appearance,” or simply “in appearance,” and the thing in itself “outside 
its relation to appearance.” On this two-sense reading, the will is the 
thing-in-itself, but not in the absolute (Kantian) sense as that which lies 
outside its relation to appearance. Put in David Cartwright’s words, “the 
will is the thing-in-itself in a relative sense, namely, that it is the essence 
or content of appearances; that which gives the phenomena both their 
character and meaning.”33 
I should first note that I am aware of no passage where 
Schopenhauer admits that he holds, simultaneously, two distinct 
conceptions of the thing-in-itself. John Atwell is also aware of this 
interpretive difficulty: “Unfortunately, Schopenhauer does not explicitly 
say that he has two very different conceptions of the thing-in-itself.”34 
This interpretation is based upon rather slim textual evidence. 
Commentators mainly point to a letter from 1852, sent to Julius 
Frauenstädt, Schopenhauer’s disciple and future literary executor, 
where Schopenhauer attempts (rather unsuccessfully, in my view) to 
clarify his use of the term “thing-in-itself”: 
                                                     
30 WWR 2, 196. 
31 Young, Schopenhauer, 99. 
32 Atwell, Schopenhauer and the Character of the World; Cartwright, “Two 
Senses of ‘Thing-in-itself’”; Young, Schopenhauer. 
33 Cartwright, “Two Senses of ‘Thing-in-itself’,” 32. 
34 Atwell, Schopenhauer and the Character of the World, 127. 
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It is precisely my great discovery that Kant’s thing-in-itself is that 
which we find in self-consciousness as the will. . . . But this will is 
thing-in-itself merely in relation to appearance: it is what this 
[appearance] is, independently of our perception and representation, 
which means precisely in itself; therefore it is that which appears in 
every appearance.35 
Or, consider the following remarks from another letter written a 
year later, again to Frauenstädt: 
[My philosophy] teaches what appearance is, and what the thing-in-
itself is. This [latter], however, is the thing-in-itself merely relatively, 
i.e., in its relation to appearance; and this [appearance] is appearance 
merely in its relation to the thing-in-itself. . . . What, however, the 
thing-in-itself is outside that relation I have never said, because I 
don’t know it; but in that relation it is will to life.36 
According to Young, “the crucial point that emerges from these letters 
is, clearly, the distinction between two senses of ‘thing in itself’: the 
thing in itself ‘in its relation to appearance’, or simply ‘in appearance’, 
and the thing in itself ‘outside its relation to appearance’.”37 It is indeed 
tempting to think that, in these letters, Schopenhauer (perhaps under 
the pressure of his critics38) proceeds to qualify his use of the term 
“thing-in-itself” with the phrases such as “merely relatively” and “merely 
in relation to appearance.” However, it is entirely unclear why 
Schopenhauer insists on calling the will the thing-in-itself even in this 
relative sense. Why does he not call the will simply the essence of the 
phenomenal world? This at least points to a certain tension in this 
interpretation of which Cartwright is also aware. He says, “Still, there 
seems to be something disingenuous about Schopenhauer’s retention of 
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the idea that the will [is] the thing-in-itself in any sense.” 39  The 
suggestion that Schopenhauer employs the term “thing-in-itself” in a 
specialized sense alone does not explain why he chooses to “retain the 
Kantian expression as a standing formula” and not just use a different 
word altogether.40 
It seems to be in accord with this reading that Schopenhauer 
elsewhere says that the thing-in-itself “is precisely that which, insofar as 
it falls within consciousness, represents itself as will [ist ebendas, was, 
indem es ins Bewußtsein fällt, sich als Wille darstellt].”41 Or, to put it in 
less Schopenhauerian language, there is one and only one thing-in-itself 
that appears in this world we experience most distinctly as the 
conscious will of the human being. And, admittedly, we cannot go 
beyond this most immediate manifestation of the thing-in-itself because 
we cannot go beyond our consciousness to apprehend things as they are 
in themselves—in a nonrelative, absolute sense. Therefore, 
Schopenhauer concludes, “the question what that may be in so far as it 
does not fall within consciousness, that is to say, what it is absolutely in 
itself, remains unanswerable.”42 
Now, there are two things to note here. First, it is quite clear from 
Schopenhauer’s so-called relative conception of the thing-in-itself that, 
strictly speaking, the will is not the thing-in-itself but only a 
“phenomenal appearance.” And second, a problem seems to come up: 
Construed this way, the thing-in-itself is not absolutely and completely 
beyond our comprehension. It is not that we know nothing about the 
thing-in-itself. On the contrary, we know something about it in its 
relation to the phenomena, namely, that it “represents itself as will.”43 
This poses a problem, however, because this is still a very un-Kantian 
way of conceptualizing the thing-in-itself. While assuming there is no 
direct intuition into the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer maintains that the 
thing-in-itself is given from within phenomenal consciousness. He says,  
[A]lthough no one can recognize the thing-in-itself through the veil 
of the forms of perception, on the other hand everyone carries this 
within himself, in fact he himself is it; hence in self-consciousness it 
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40 WWR 1, §22, 110. 
41 Werke 2, 634. My translation. 
42 Ibid. My emphasis. 
43 Ibid. 
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must be in some way accessible [irgendwie zugänglich] to him, 
although still only conditionally.44  
Elsewhere, Schopenhauer similarly emphasizes that “we have not, like 
Kant, absolutely given up the ability to know the thing-in-itself; on the 
contrary, we know that it is to be looked for in the will.”45 However, 
Schopenhauer never further clarifies how exactly the thing-in-itself 
relates to and manifests in the phenomena. 
By speaking of a positive relation of the thing-in-itself to the objects 
of sensory experience, Schopenhauer radically departs from Kant’s 
understanding of the thing-in-itself. Kant’s conception of the thing-in-
itself leaves no space for any claim about any (temporal) relation 
between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenal contents of 
consciousness. Kant says, “All our intuition is nothing but the 
representation of appearance . . . . [T]he things that we intuit are not in 
themselves what we intuit them to be.”46 Kant clearly dismisses the 
possibility of our gaining knowledge of the relation between the thing-
in-itself and any phenomena, for example, the claims that privilege the 
will or a special kind of intuition that allegedly enables access to the 
reality of the thing-in-itself. What the objects may be in themselves can 
never be known, even “through the most enlightened cognition of their 
appearance.”47 
To make this point clearer, we just need to turn to what 
Schopenhauer repeatedly and expressly says regarding his 
understanding of the thing-in-itself: “I admit entirely Kant’s doctrine that 
the world of experience is mere phenomenon . . . but I add that, precisely 
as phenomenal appearance, it is the manifestation of that which 
appears, and with him I call that which appears the thing-in-itself.”48 And 
Schopenhauer emphatically reminds us that he “never speaks of the 
thing-in-itself otherwise than in its relation to the phenomenon.”49 
Although the above passage clearly suggests that Schopenhauer 
endorses Kant’s distinction between appearances and the thing-in-itself, 
he significantly alters Kant’s understanding of the thing-in-itself. As 
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SCHOPENHAUER’S DOCTRINE OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF 265 
Young puts it, “he muddies the waters by quite wrongly suggesting that 
[this] is Kant’s sense of the term”; however, “what Schopenhauer is in 
fact doing here is introducing a new, non-Kantian sense of ‘thing in 
itself’.”50 The thing-in-itself, as Kant often uses this expression, is simply 
the way a thing is apart from all relations to other objects, and as such, 
it is independent of a thinking subject and hence beyond the world of 
phenomena. This is obviously not how Schopenhauer conceives of and 
uses this expression, because, as shown above, he remains occupied 
with what seems to be central to his philosophical concerns, namely, 
the relation of the thing-in-itself to the phenomena and the question of 
the knowability (Erkennbarkeit) of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself 
in the only proper sense Schopenhauer seems to acknowledge at this 
point is “that which appears in the world most distinctly as the will.”51 
But only that which is spatial and capable of change appears. The thing-
in-itself is not spatial or temporal in any way but transcends all human 
thought and comprehension. Therefore, it seems problematic to 
maintain that the thing-in-itself appears in the phenomenal world. 
Central to the second view is the idea that the thing-in-itself 
signifies a reality that is fundamentally different from the will. Now, in 
the second edition of WWR (1844), Schopenhauer openly admits that 
“the thing-in-itself . . . may have, entirely outside all possible 
phenomenon, determinations, qualities, modes of existence which for 
us are absolutely unknowable and which then remains as the inner 
nature of the thing-in-itself.”52 Furthermore, sensing the implausibility 
                                                     
50 Young, Schopenhauer, 97. 
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(travel diary), “this very thing-in-itself . . . may have, quite apart from all possible 
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know nothing about it. Wicks claims that, for Schopenhauer, “mystical 
knowledge of the thing-in-itself is attainable.” Ibid. And the fact that 
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Apparently, Wicks fails to recognize that Schopenhauer develops a third view 
on the concept of the thing-in-itself as that which does not will life. On this 
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of identifying the thing-in-itself as the will, Schopenhauer backpedals 
and claims that the will, strictly speaking, is not the thing-in-itself but 
instead a phenomenal appearance of it. To the extent that it is possible 
to distinguish myself, as this knowing subject, from me, as the one who 
wills, the immediate experience of our own will is just a perception in 
the intellect, and hence it “remains phenomenon only.”53 
But then one wonders what sense, if any, is left for the claim that 
“the will is Kant’s thing-in-itself.” This is where Schopenhauer’s 
persuasiveness as a philosopher appears to be limited because he 
eventually takes refuge in figurative language. The will is not the thing-
in-itself; however, as being completely different in kind from all other 
phenomena, it is distinguished by its immediateness to the thing-in-itself 
and hence “is its representative for us [es für uns vertritt].”54 Thus, it is 
only in this sense that Schopenhauer says he refers to the will as the 
thing-in-itself.55 And, only in this way, he contends, Kant's doctrine of 
the unknowability of the thing in itself “is modified to the extent that the 
thing-in-itself is merely not absolutely and completely knowable.”56 In 
his 1820–21 Reisebuch (travel diary), Schopenhauer writes, “Therefore 
the word will, used for thing-in-itself, is indeed only the description of 
the thing-in-itself through its most distinct phenomenon.”57 Just as the 
flag is not the country nor the idol a god, but a representative thereof, 
the will is not the thing-in-itself but only its representative for us. Yet, 
Schopenhauer’s figurative equation of the thing-in-itself with the will 
does not help us much to understand better the essence of the 
relationship between the representative (the will) and the represented 
(the thing-in-itself). As D. W. Hamlyn aptly points out, “Kant was surely 
right; once given the notion of a thing-in-itself there is no way of spelling 
out the relation between it and phenomena, and Schopenhauer’s claim 
                                                     
view, “what philosophy can express only negatively as denial of the will . . . 
cannot really be called knowledge.” WWR 1, §71, 410. The thing-in-itself and its 
attributes transcend everything. It cannot be understood; and no experience, 
mystical or otherwise, can lead to even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself. 
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the section below.  
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56 Ibid. 
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to find evidence of the nature of the thing-in-itself in phenomena is just 
illusion.”58 
In sum, at places Schopenhauer clearly backs away from strictly 
identifying the thing-in-itself with the will. He clarifies that he only 
names the thing-in-itself after its most distinct appearance. On the face 
of it, this move seems to avoid saddling Schopenhauer with an 
implausible view, though now he loses much of his air of “great 
discovery,” which had made him something of a cause célèbre in the 
post-Kantian era. 59  Here, we come to see a Schopenhauer who, in 
contrast to his earlier confidence, becomes more modest about the 
possibility of our epistemological access to the ultimate reality. In other 
words, his understanding of the thing-in-itself, for the first time, takes a 
step back in the opposite (Kantian) direction. 
Sandra Shapshay offers an interpretation that comes close to 
endorsing this “modified” view. One merit of Shapshay’s reading is that 
it suggests at least a way to spell out the relation between the thing-in-
itself and phenomena. Shapshay simply dismisses the two-sense reading 
of Schopenhauer’s understanding of the thing-in-itself on the grounds 
that “[t]his account . . . runs counter to many central passages in 
Schopenhauer’s main work, where he says quite explicitly that Will is 
the Kantian thing-in-itself.”60 It is clear from this remark that Shapshay 
does not postulate any changes in Schopenhauer’s thinking since the 
first publication of WWR. As we saw above, among the commentators 
who recognize the problem with claiming that the will is the Kantian 
thing-in-itself, some suggest that Schopenhauer simply misunderstood 
Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself” and unwittingly introduced “a new, 
non-Kantian sense of ‘thing in itself’.” 61  Shapshay’s response to this 
problem, on the other hand, does not involve attributing to 
Schopenhauer a misunderstanding of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Her 
solution to the problem consists in retaining the original, Kantian sense 
of “thing-in-itself” and attributing to the expression “the will is the thing-
in-itself” a different meaning that can render it plausible. 
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Shapshay argues that the expression “the will is Kant’s thing-in-
itself” should not be taken as literal but metonymical. A metonym is a 
figure of speech in which the name of a thing is replaced with the name 
of something closely associated with or considered to be part of the 
original. Here are some examples of metonymic phrases: “Captain 
Haddock is very fond of the bottle.” Here the word “bottle” stands for 
alcoholic beverages with which “the bottle” is generally contiguous. 
Similarly, the word “crown” may stand for the king, “hands” for workers, 
and so on. Shapshay suggests that Schopenhauer uses a special kind of 
metonymic device to refer to the thing-in-itself as the will: denominatio 
a potiori or “naming from the main part or feature of a thing.” By naming 
the thing-in-itself after its most distinct phenomenon (or something with 
which it is contiguous), Schopenhauer, Shapshay claims, is trying to get 
us to extend the concept “will” (with which we are immediately and 
noninferentially acquainted in inner perception) beyond its usual 
confines and its original emphasis on the individual—in other words, 
“beyond the bounds of possible sensation to the thing-in-itself.”62 He 
“invites us to feel for ourselves the mysterious connection between our 
wills and the in-itself of the world in general.”63 And he “invites [us] to 
do this on the strength of [our] special insight into [our] own wills.”64 
Insofar as the will is only in time (and other phenomena are in space 
and time), the will, Schopenhauer claims, is the phenomenon that is the 
most closely associated with the thing-in-itself. And by utilizing this 
unique relation of contiguity between the will and the thing-in-itself, 
Shapshay proposes, Schopenhauer metonymically (in other words, not 
literally) identifies the thing-in-itself with the will. 
Although Shapshay’s gloss may look attractive, particularly to a 
reader who is sympathetic to the strategy of teasing out the linguistic 
nuances of Schopenhauerian language, I take issue with her 
interpretation on the following grounds. First, she seems to have 
extended Schopenhauer’s use of the phrase denominatio a potiori, 
literally “denomination by the stronger or more important,” even further 
than Schopenhauer himself intended. The main textual evidence for 
Shapshay’s interpretation comes from the following passage in the first 
edition of WWR: 
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Now, if this thing-in-itself (we will retain the Kantian expression as a 
standing formula) . . . can be none other than the most complete of 
all its phenomena, i.e., the most distinct, the most developed, the 
most directly enlightened by knowledge; but this is precisely man’s 
will. We have to observe, however, that here of course we use only a 
denominatio a potiori, by which the concept of will therefore 
receives a greater extension than it has hitherto had. . . . But anyone 
who is incapable of carrying out the required extension of the 
concept will remain involved in a permanent misunderstanding. For 
by the word will, he will always understand only that species of it 
hitherto exclusively described by the term, that is to say, the will 
guided by knowledge, strictly according to motives, indeed only to 
abstract motives, thus manifesting itself under the guidance of the 
faculty of reason. This, as we have said, is only the most distinct 
phenomenon or appearance of the will. We must now clearly 
separate out in our thoughts the innermost essence of this 
phenomenon, known to us directly, and then transfer it to all the 
weaker, less distinct phenomena of the same essence, and by so 
doing achieve the desired extension of the concept of will.65 
The first thing to note is that Schopenhauer seems to be retaining 
the concept of “thing-in-itself” while subverting its meaning by 
identifying it with the will. My reading of this passage leads me to think 
that it is not so much that Schopenhauer uses the concept “will” as a 
metonym for the Kantian thing-in-itself. Rather, he identifies the will as 
the most important aspect of human nature, that which leads human 
beings to act as they do. His main purpose is, then, to persuade us to 
extend the human will, by virtue of a denominatio a potiori, to the whole 
universe so as to demonstrate how diversity, striving, and antagonism 
unfold within the broader context of the natural processes. So, contrary 
to Shapshay’s suggestion, here Schopenhauer seems to invite us to feel 
for ourselves the connection between our wills and all other forms of 
life (including also inanimate forms of existence) and not necessarily 
the nonphenomenal essence, the in-itself, of all being. Indeed, in a later 
work from 1839 Schopenhauer indirectly supports my contention by 
noting that he had been primarily concerned with “the question whether 
the inner condition of reaction to external causes in the case of beings 
without cognition and even without life is essentially identical with what 
we call the will in ourselves.”66 Therefore, I believe the chief weakness 
of Shapshay’s interpretation derives from her overestimating and 
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misreading the function of denominatio a potiori in the above-
mentioned passage. 
Second, and equally significant, Shapshay’s metonymic approach to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy inevitably remains in tension with what he 
says about the thing-in-itself and its relation to phenomena elsewhere. 
Shapshay is right in that the textual evidence indeed shows that 
Schopenhauer regards the will as (allegedly) the least mediated of all 
phenomena and hence as the closest phenomenon of the thing-in-itself. 
Yet elsewhere Schopenhauer says things that appear to fly in the face of 
this key assumption about the will’s closeness to the thing-in-itself. In 
one instance, he boldly asserts that “the two [in other words, the thing-
in-itself and the phenomenon] are absolutely incommensurable 
[schlechthin inkommensurabel]. The whole mode of being of the one, 
together with all the fundamental laws of this being, signifies nothing, 
and less than nothing, in the other.”67 But if, as Schopenhauer claims 
here, the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon are epistemologically and 
ontologically incommensurable, then it becomes puzzling how we can 
speak of a (metonymic) relation of contiguity between the two. It seems 
more plausible to admit that we simply cannot know whether the will 
as a temporally mediated phenomenon bears such relation to the thing-
in-itself, because the thing-in-itself, as Schopenhauer’s above remark 
suggests, stands outside all possibility of any relation to phenomena 
(including our own will).68 
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III 
In this section I want to suggest that the problematic aspect of the 
identification of the thing-in-itself with the will could reveal a central 
insight highlighted only by Schopenhauer’s later works, which he 
describes as follows: 
Kant brought to light the great though negative truth that time cannot 
belong to the thing-in-itself, because it lies preformed in our 
apprehension. . . . I am now trying to show the positive aspect of the 
matter, namely that the thing-in-itself remains untouched by time and 
by that which is possible only through time, that is, by arising and 
passing away.69 
Here we see that Schopenhauer’s emphasis shifts from grappling with 
the temporal aspect of the will (as the thing-in-itself) to focusing on a 
reality that can be shown to be both “nonspatial” and “nontemporal,” 
and hence is free from representation and the will. In the remainder of 
my analysis, I will examine the texts that in many ways substantiate this 
apparent shift in Schopenhauer’s thinking. 
So far, I have distinguished two different views of the thing-in-itself 
in Schopenhauer: first, the view that the thing-in-itself is the will, and 
second, the view that the thing-in-itself is that which appears in the 
world most distinctly as the will. I have presented them as two 
incompatible views he happens to hold simultaneously. I now further 
distinguish a third view, namely, that the thing-in-itself is that which 
does not will life. 
I take the passage below, in which Schopenhauer discusses the 
ascetic effects of tragic representations of suffering on the spectator, as 
implicitly putting forward a third view on the thing-in-itself: 
In the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the will-to-live itself . . . 
in the tragedy the terrible side of life is presented to us, the wailing 
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and lamentation of mankind, the dominion of chance and error, the 
fall of the righteous, the triumph of the wicked; and so that aspect of 
the world is brought before our eyes which directly opposes our will. 
At this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn our will away from life, 
to give up willing and loving life. But precisely in this way we become 
aware that there is still left in us something different that we cannot 
possibly know positively, but only negatively, as that which does not 
will life.70 
According to this passage, the experience of tragic suffering has almost 
an unnatural yet positive purpose, which is to point to the presence of a 
radically different reality, a mode of existence foreign to what we 
ordinarily experience. Tragedy realizes this purpose in two ways; first, 
by evoking a deep sense of our finitude and vulnerability vis-à-vis the 
terrible side of worldly existence, the preponderance of misery over 
happiness in human life; second, by producing a substantial tempering 
or quieting effect on the will and leading to an attitude of ascetic 
indifference toward life and one’s worldly self. The above passage 
focuses exclusively on witnessing suffering in others (particularly when 
it appears senseless or unfair). However, the same effect can also be 
achieved by going through extreme personal suffering, as evidenced by 
the following remark. “[A]t times,” Schopenhauer points out,  
in the hard experience of our own sufferings or in the vividly 
recognized suffering of others, knowledge of the vanity and 
bitterness of life comes close to us. . . . We would like to deprive 
desires of their sting, close the entry to all suffering, purify and 
sanctify ourselves by complete and final resignation.71  
Depending of course on the success and intensity with which it realizes 
this twofold purpose, tragic pathos can hold before us an aspect of 
reality that we cannot ordinarily conceive of, much less know, 
something that stands in direct opposition to everything that lives and 
strives. Although Schopenhauer does not use the term “thing-in-itself” 
in this passage, it is quite clear from the context of his discussion what 
the phrase “that which does not will life” refers to, namely, something 
that we cannot know in any positive sense. 
Schopenhauer later expresses this position more clearly in the 
following passage from Parerga and Paralipomena, published in 1851 
(seven years after WWR 2): 
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All this is accordingly finite existence whose opposite would be 
conceivable as infinite, as exposed to no attack from without [in 
other words, indestructible], or as requiring no help from without, 
and therefore as . . . in eternal rest and calm . . . without change, 
without time, without multiplicity and diversity, the negative 
knowledge of which is the keynote of Plato’s philosophy. Such an 
existence must be that to which the denial of the will-to-live opens 
the way.72 
There are a couple of points to be made here. The first thing that catches 
one’s attention is Schopenhauer’s attempt to discern the thing-in-itself 
not through the concept of will but through the ascetic denial of the will, 
a state that develops after experiencing or witnessing a tragic event. The 
essence or in-itself of the world manifests itself continually and most 
distinctly in the will of a human being. This idea lies at the core of the 
second view that we find in Schopenhauer’s writings. 
In his discussion of the second view, Schopenhauer seems to 
operate with a non-Kantian sense of “thing-in-itself,” namely, as 
Cartwright and the likeminded commentators put it, the thing in itself 
“in its relation to appearance.” It follows from this view that the 
immediate, volitional awareness of one’s self, or experiencing oneself 
as a conscious, willing being, facilitates an understanding of the essence 
or in-itself of the phenomenal world. However, at times Schopenhauer 
moves away from this view and the understanding of the thing-in-itself 
as the essence or content of appearances to a more Kantian sense of 
“thing-in-itself.” This apparent change of view in Schopenhauer is not, 
however, a change in his basic understanding of the will. Central to 
understanding the third view is the role of one’s relation to one’s own 
will in determining one’s overall attitude toward life, whether that of 
affirmation or that of denial. According to Schopenhauer, there are two 
distinct ways of attending to our own will. One’s relation to one’s own 
will consists in either a sense of inclination or striving toward something 
not-yet-reached, or a sense of retreat from or striving “away from the 
interest of the will.”73 The first way of attending to one’s will leads to an 
act by which the will-to-live affirms itself.  
The second way of attending to one’s will, on the other hand, opens 
the possibility of the suppression of willing, of overcoming the self and 
the phenomenal world, and thus of recognizing a reality that is beyond 
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plurality, transience and decay, change and extinction, in other words, 
a reality beyond willing. From the above-cited passages, it follows that 
one’s attending to the felt temporal immediacy of one’s embodied self is 
no longer singled out as a unique experience (because it only reveals the 
vanity and insatiability of all that is worldly). It is, rather, one’s 
remaining undisturbed by the excitements or immediate affections of 
the will, and hence the experience of dissociating or turning away from 
all transient forms of phenomenal existence and all plurality in time and 
space that enables one to participate in the recognition of a reality that 
exists independently of one’s cognizing it. More specifically, the very 
possibility of abandonment—denial of one’s will, renouncing the 
temporary—instigated by tragic suffering, enables one to know that 
there exists something beyond the self, which resides outside the 
phenomenal realm of experience. The world presents itself as the 
blindly striving will, “the luckiest development of which is that it comes 
to itself in order to abolish itself.” 74  In this self-abolishing, 
Schopenhauer suggests, it reveals a consciousness that is devoid of 
thought, differentiation, conceptualization, and hence not reducible to 
the reflective apprehension of one’s own being. The underlying goal of 
Schopenhauer’s later treatment of ascetic themes is to elucidate the 
nature of the unique way such consciousness relates us to something 
that persists behind and above all time, something that is not itself in 
time. Put simply and somewhat paradoxically, for Schopenhauer, it is as 
if the will negates itself in order to disclose to itself what it truly is and 
hence voluntarily passes “over into empty nothingness.”75 This is what I 
take to be the surface import of Schopenhauer’s rather cryptic remark 
that  
[a]t this sight [of tragic suffering] we feel ourselves urged to turn our 
will away from life, to give up willing and loving life. But precisely in 
this way we become aware that there is still left in us something 
different that we cannot possibly know positively, but only 
negatively, as that which does not will life.76 
Facing the tragedies of human life and thus the prospect of death, 
for Schopenhauer, can afford us a unique perspective by which we may 
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arrive at “the deep consciousness of the indestructibility of our real 
inner nature [das tiefinnere Bewußtsein der Unzerstörbarkeit unsers 
Wesens].”77 But what is it about us that is indestructible and that does 
not rest on the phenomenon? Schopenhauer’s starting point is that “a 
reasonable person can think of himself as imperishable only in so far as 
he thinks of himself as beginningless [anfangslos], as eternal [ewig], in 
fact as timeless [zeitlos].”78 If we regard ourselves as having come out 
of nothing, then we must also accept that at some point in life we will 
become nothing again. Likewise, if we regard our birth as the absolute 
beginning of our existence, then we must also accept that our death one 
day will be our absolute end. 
Dying, Schopenhauer claims, represents only the temporal 
destruction of the phenomenal individual. However, where the self 
dissolves into the timeless, “a sure and certain feeling says to everyone 
that there is in him something positively imperishable and indestructible 
[sagt jedem ein sicheres Gefühl, daß in ihm etwas schlechthin 
Unvergängliches und Unzerstörbares sei],” “that something in us does 
not pass away with time . . . but endures unchanged.” 79  However, 
Schopenhauer continues, we are not able to comprehend exactly what 
this imperishable element is. It is not consciousness any more than it is 
the body, on which the conscious experience supervenes. 80  We 
ordinarily tend to think of ourselves as existing only objectively, solely 
for the perceiving consciousness, as this particular individual. And this 
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way of placing our existence in the identity of consciousness, 
Schopenhauer claims, is what really holds us back from recognizing 
what is independent of and beyond our phenomenal selves. If, on the 
other hand, we could bring to our consciousness that up until now we 
have existed, “an infinite time, and thus an infinity of changes, has run 
its course, but yet notwithstanding this” we exist. 81  Therefore, our 
existence must rest on “some original necessity [irgendeiner 
ursprünglichen Nothwendigkeit].” 82  And this necessity, which has 
manifested itself in this particular form, cannot be “limited to such a 
brief span of time, but . . . is active at all times [sondern daß sie in jeder 
wirke].”83 It follows that “what is proved to be indestructible through 
death is not really the individual” but something that is free from the 
causal determinism to which all things are susceptible.84 With death we 
surely lose both our individuality and consciousness, “but not what 
produced and maintained consciousness; life is extinguished, but with 
it not the principle of life which manifested itself in it.”85 Therefore, the 
denial of the will-to-live or the approach of death, Schopenhauer insists, 
is not just about giving up our individual character. Rather, it is a sure 
and certain guide by which we are to be led to “the consciousness of our 
original and eternal nature [dem Bewußtsein unserer Ursprünglichkeit 
und Ewigkeit]” or, more specifically, “the deep conviction [die tiefe 
Überzeugung]” of the being-in-itself of the world that, based on 
Schopenhauer’s purely anecdotal observations, “everyone carries at the 
bottom of his heart.”86 Death reveals that our “true essence-in-itself does 
not know either time, beginning, end, or the limits of a given 
individuality.”87 
There are two problems with what Schopenhauer says here about 
resignation from willing and from life. One relates to the nature of the 
experience of resignation, specifically, its accompanying feeling of 
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conviction that something in us never perishes, something that is 
beyond our will. The other is about how far, for Schopenhauer, ascetic 
resignation can take us, in other words, whether it can lead to, or open 
the way to, a transcendental knowledge that goes beyond the limits of 
what can only be known phenomenally. Schopenhauer claims that, in a 
state of ascetic resignation or liberation from the one-sided, 
representative reality of human experience, we all grasp intuitively and 
immediately, so it appears, the in-itself of our own phenomenon. One 
should be careful, however, in viewing the feelings of certainty and 
conviction as indications of knowledge. Some people talk of a “sure and 
certain” feeling that they are going to win the lottery, that they have 
arrived at the solution to a difficult problem, or that God is telling them 
to do something. Should we regard these as different instances of the 
same kind of phenomenon, which involve the same mental states and 
processes? Some of our intuitions are well founded, correspond to 
immediate apprehensions of sensory events, and hence present a 
reasonable possibility, while some are purely subjective, irrational, or 
nonverifiable. Schopenhauer does not really attempt to work out such 
differences or spell out any specifics. There are no criteria in 
Schopenhauer’s account for determining whether a felt awareness leads 
to the apprehension of something as it really is or only appears to be a 
genuine intuition. 
Another issue concerns how, exactly, the felt consciousness of the 
indestructibility of one’s being can provide one with the insight that 
enables one to sense something beyond all possibility of experience. On 
the one hand, in the second volume of Parerga and Paralipomena, 
Schopenhauer claims that we can have but negative knowledge 
(negative Erkenntnis) of the thing-in-itself, a knowledge of what it is not, 
as that which does not will life, and hence without change, time, 
multiplicity, and diversity.88 Yet, on the other hand, elsewhere he seems 
to suggest that no knowledge, whether positive or negative, about the 
in-itself beyond the will is possible for us: “[W]here the being-in-itself of 
things begins, knowledge ceases, [because] all knowledge primarily and 
essentially concerns merely phenomena.” 89  Even if “negative 
knowledge” significantly differs from positive knowledge, as 
Schopenhauer seems to suggest, it is still knowledge. Thus, it appears 
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on the face of it somewhat problematic to speak of a knowledge (albeit 
negative) of the thing-in-itself. Now perhaps by “negative knowledge” 
Schopenhauer means to signify not a knowledge of a thing as such but, 
rather, an attempt to determine our position in relation to something 
that necessarily exceeds our cognitive limits. In his later writings he 
seems less concerned about how the relation of the thing-in-itself to the 
objects of phenomenal experience is ultimately to be understood. In a 
passage from the second edition of WWR, where the possibility of 
grasping that relation is placed in question, he says, “[S]uch knowledge 
is . . . not ever or anywhere possible; that those relations [between the 
thing-in-itself and the phenomena] are not only relatively but absolutely 
inscrutable.” He reiterates more repeatedly and firmly “that not only 
does no one know them, but that they are in themselves unknowable, 
since they do not enter into the form of knowledge in general.”90 In other 
words, we may conceive of the thing-in-itself as a reality distinct from 
phenomenal reality, yet we remain simply incapable of comprehending 
its relation to the phenomena. 
There are other passages that suggest a more Kantian sense of 
“thing-in-itself.” At several places in Parerga and Paralipomena, 
Schopenhauer appeals to the Kantian understanding of the thing-in-
itself. “[I]n the proper Kantian sense,” he says, the thing-in-itself 
“expresses that which exists independently of perception through any 
of our senses,” 91  something quite different from the phenomena, 
something metaphysical, “distinct from everything physical.”92 And in 
line with this, he maintains that “[w]here the thing-in-itself begins, the 
phenomenon ends.”93 Thus, any attempt to gain insight into the former 
by means of the latter, he consistently concludes, “proves to be like the 
attempt to cover two absolutely dissimilar figures by each other, which 
never succeeds because one or other corner sticks out, however we turn 
the figures.”94 Note that Schopenhauer’s remark here echoes the point 
made earlier (in WWR 2, 497) about the absolute incommensurability of 
the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon. In his later years he continues 
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to embrace the idea that this world is the will and nothing besides. And 
he adds, allegorically, that if we endeavor to move beyond the world of 
phenomena, “everything is then ‘land on which one cannot stand, water 
in which one cannot swim.’”95 The essence of things before or beyond 
the phenomenal realm of experience, “and consequently beyond the 
will, is not open to any investigation.” 96  Hence, Schopenhauer 
concludes, “[s]o much as regards the limits of my philosophy and of all 
philosophy.” 97  It appears that the above cautionary note says it all, 
namely, that we can know nothing about a reality that lies beyond the 
bounds of all possible experience because such an existence overcomes 
the separation inherent in the subject–object split, the only means by 
which we can perceive or comprehend anything at all. An intuition in 
which the opposition of object and subject is canceled is simply 
inconceivable. Or, to put it in Schopenhauer’s own words, 
“knowableness in general, with its most essential, and therefore 
constantly necessary, form of subject and object, belongs merely to the 
phenomenon, not to the being-in-itself of things.”98  
This and Schopenhauer’s later writings express a significant 
affinity with Kant. And in his later years Schopenhauer appears to 
embrace every opportunity to stress this affinity:  
[My philosophy] arrives at no conclusions as to what exists beyond 
all possible experience, but furnishes merely an explanation and 
interpretation of what is given in the external world and in self-
consciousness. It is therefore content to comprehend the true nature 
of the world according to its inner connexion with itself. 
Consequently, it is immanent in the Kantian sense of the word.99  
He then curiously adds:  
After all my explanations, it can still be asked, for example, from 
what this will has sprung, which is free to affirm itself, the 
phenomenal appearance of this being the world, or to deny itself, the 
phenomenal appearance of which we do not know. What is the 
fatality lying beyond all experience which has put it in the extremely 
precarious dilemma of appearing as a world in which suffering and 
death reign, or else of denying its own inner being? . . . Further, it 
may be asked how deeply in the being-in-itself of the world do the 
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roots of individuality go. In any case, the answer to this might be that 
they go as deeply as the affirmation of the will-to-live; where the 
denial of the will occurs, they cease, for with the affirmation they 
sprang into existence. We might even put the question: “What would 
I be, if I were not the will-to-live?” and more of the same kind.100 
These questions, Schopenhauer says, defy our ability to come to any 
kind of answer at all, simply because for us the only possible way of 
conceiving and knowing things is through the forms of the intellect. We 
apprehend everything in temporal terms, in the form of a perceived 
succession, and as involving some mental representation extracted 
from sensory input in accordance with a cause–effect pattern. And as a 
result, “We cannot possibly escape from this sphere, in which all 
possibility of our knowledge is to be found.”101 Thus, strictly speaking, 
no experience, as Schopenhauer suggests here, opens the way to a 
knowledge of the in-itself, a knowledge of ultimate truth or a reality in-
itself. Here his suggestion that intuition, in the sense of consciousness 
or apprehension of something directly, without the functions of the 
understanding, needs to be always sense based, if not purely sensory in 
character, undermines his other claim that we can access the thing-in-
itself solely from within, as affecting the will in itself and immediately. 
Moira Nicholls similarly portrays Schopenhauer as having 
expressed significantly different views on the thing-in-itself. She argues 
that Schopenhauer’s later writings suggest that the will is the thing-in-
itself not in an absolute sense but in a qualified sense, as something 
contiguous with the thing-in-itself. This suggests that the nature of the 
thing-in-itself remains mainly (if not entirely) unknown to us. 
“Speculatively,” Nicholls continues,  
this shift from a strict identity of the will with the thing-in-itself to 
the view that the will is just one aspect of the thing-in-itself suggests 
that had Schopenhauer lived longer, he may well have shifted his 
views even further so as to embrace the idea that the thing-in-itself 
is not will at all, but instead is solely the object of awareness of those 
who have achieved salvation.102 
Notice that Nicholls regards these views as different stages or shifts 
in Schopenhauer’s thinking, but I consider them as essentially 
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incompatible views that Schopenhauer apparently did not recognize as 
incompatible and hence held simultaneously. Moreover, interpretative 
challenges notwithstanding, I have hopefully demonstrated that there 
are passages in Schopenhauer that contain the view that the thing-in-
itself is beyond the will and the experience of our senses. In other 
words, he already recognized what Nicholls speculates he might have 
recognized about the thing-in-itself, though perhaps not as expressly as 
we would expect from him. It is rather astonishing that commentators 
have effectively neglected this aspect of Schopenhauer’s thought and 
continue in vain to discuss strategies for resolving the conflict between 
his incompatible views. As the above analysis suggests, at times he not 
only seems to give up the claim that the thing-in-itself is the will but also 
avoids with care any hint of a possible correspondence between the 
thing-in-itself and the will. He appears no longer to regard the will as an 
aspect of the thing-in-itself but, rather, as the one and the same 
immanent force that animates all phenomenal processes and activities. 
The will as an endless striving for and of life stands, on the third view, 
in direct opposition to the thing-in-itself, with which this domain of 
arising, struggling, suffering, privation, and passing away has no relation 
or association. Since the world as it is in-itself is absolutely 
incommensurable with the world as we perceive it through our senses 
and our interpretations of those perceptions, this in-itself remains 
hidden in mystery. The knowledge of any possible aspect of it lies 
beyond human reach because such a mode of existence bears no 
relation whatsoever to any property, event, or object in the phenomenal 
world. All we have is, at the very least, some kind of negative knowledge 
claim, namely, that the thing-in-itself neither wills life nor enters our 
experience. In effect, Schopenhauer is telling us that we can never claim 
knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Since “that to which the denial of the 
will-to-live opens the way” 103  simply defies all understanding, our 
concepts, which have their basis in sense experience or perception, 
cannot be meaningfully applied to it. 
Despite the fact that the third view is of particular relevance for 
enriching our understanding of Schopenhauer’s ideas on the denial of 
the will and the obliteration of one’s individuality, his ambiguous claim 
that the thing-in-itself is the will continues to engage commentators’ 
interest more deeply. In the final analysis, Schopenhauer, Shapshay 
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argues, mainly by way of figurative talk, invites us to feel for ourselves 
the connection between our wills and the in-itself that goes beyond the 
phenomenal-representational content of consciousness. 104  However, 
Shapshay’s interpretation appears to overlook a crucial feature of the 
will that, in my view, is finely captured by Yasuo Kamata, who remarks 
that “in a way” the will “transcends the world as representation, even 
though it does not point to any substance outside of consciousness [in 
other words, an in-itself].” 105  The primary concern here is whether 
Shapshay is attributing to the will, as the basic disposition of our being, 
a power that it does not necessarily possess in the first place, in other 
words, its supposed ability in creating a connection of some sort, which 
can be described as metonymic or otherwise, with a reality that is far 
beyond anything that the mind can embrace and comprehend. It is not 
(the immediacy or primacy of) the will but rather (the possibility of) its 
denial that induces in us a heightened awareness of the in-itself—
something that Schopenhauer particularly emphasizes in WWR 2, 433 
and PP 2, §144. Now, compared with the tendentious interpretations 
that (implicitly) blame Schopenhauer for misunderstanding the Kantian 
“thing-in-itself,” indeed we find greater plausibility in Shapshay’s 
interpretation. But there is indication in Schopenhauer’s other writings 
that makes it possible to suspect that he would actually discern a 
metonymic association of the will with the thing-in-itself, as Shapshay 
proposes. The textual evidence considered above supports an 
alternative reading of Schopenhauer’s understanding of the thing-in-
itself, which seems irreconcilable with the interpretation Shapshay 
advanced. 
IV 
So where does all this discussion leave us? At best, we may cast 
some light on the ambiguity with which Schopenhauer’s understanding 
of the thing-in-itself is fraught, and yet not dispense with it once and for 
all. Schopenhauer sometimes suggests that it is beyond human ken to 
know the relation between the thing-in-itself and phenomena. Yet, he 
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problematically continues to speak of a deeply felt conviction of the 
indestructibility of our being-in-itself that proceeds from the self-
suppression of the will. Here, Schopenhauer appears to share some 
significant parallels with Johann Gottlieb Fichte (his teacher at Berlin), 
who suggests that our knowledge, which is by no means connected with 
the thing-in-itself through representation, nevertheless may relate to it 
in a different way, through feeling. While Fichte expressed this view 
early in his philosophical career and moved on to grapple with many 
different philosophical issues, this idea might have found its way to 
Schopenhauer through the Berlin lectures. In Fichte’s words, “our 
knowledge is by no means connected directly through representation 
with things in themselves.” But, Fichte suggests, it  
is connected with them only indirectly, through feeling; that in any 
case things are represented merely as appearances, whereas they are 
felt as things in themselves; that no representation at all would be 
possible without feeling; but that things in themselves can be 
recognized only subjectively, i.e., insofar as they affect our feeling.106 
Feeling as such lacks any definite intentional content directed toward 
an immanent object of perception. It simply bypasses any conceptual 
determination that could distinguish or individuate its referent. In this 
regard, feeling differs from representation, namely, in virtue of its 
“immediate,” hence prereflective character. Feeling, owing to this 
immediacy, gets us closer to the thing-in-itself—even though this does 
not constitute (or ground) knowledge about the thing-in-itself. One 
should note at this point the similarity between this view and the one 
that takes willing to be closest to the thing-in-itself. Because feeling, just 
as willing, is nonspatial in nature, it brings us closer to the thing-in-itself. 
Schopenhauer believes the conscious awareness of one’s own willing, 
or the feeling of the indestructibility of one’s being is what enables the 
subject to gain an intuitive, immediate insight (unmittelbare Einsicht) 
into the inner nature, the in-itself of all phenomena. Such an insight 
lacks the specificity and accuracy of knowledge (Wissen), yet it is taken 
to be offering a transcending glance that reaches beyond the realm of 
empirical perception. The problem with this, however, is that although 
this felt insight is real and presumptively far more immediate than any 
other experience, it is still confined within the territory of phenomena. 
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It ultimately remains as a stirring (Regung), a phenomenal modification 
(Modifikation) of willing. Therefore, it cannot give us experiential 
access to something beyond the phenomena. Therefore, feeling, in 
whatever form and manifestation, falls short of comprehending the 
thing-in-itself. 
A question suggests itself: regarding the feeling of the 
indestructibility of one’s being, one may wonder, are we to understand 
it as the same sort of feeling that has no object, does not differentiate a 
referent, and has no conceptual determination? It may be suggested that 
the notion of “feeling” can be used in two different ways. It can 
designate a belieflike “propositional attitude” in which a given 
possibility is felt to be likely, with none or some degree of justification 
for believing that it is in fact possible. Or, feeling can just designate a 
mere stirring of one’s intuitive awareness, which may either 
immediately express a deep conviction about something that is not 
distinctly known or gradually tend toward such a conviction. For 
Schopenhauer, “the feeling of the indestructibility of one’s own inner 
nature” is just a mere “stirring” that underlies a prereflective, 
inarticulate conviction (Überzeugung) of one’s will. Schopenhauer 
more specifically refers to this as “the deep conviction of the 
impossibility of our extermination by death, which, as the inevitable 
qualms of conscience at the approach of death also testify, everyone 
carries at the bottom of his heart.”107 Owing to its obscure and mystical 
character, this particular feeling of conviction remains as something 
that can never be verified through sense experience or reached through 
conceptual means or abstract representations. It is not the sort of thing 
that can be verified, even if it may continue to affect the individual's 
psychology and determine their ultimate orientation toward life, which 
typically manifests itself as a gradual abandonment of worldly 
attachments, sensory desires, and interests.  
Schopenhauer’s characterizations suggest that this feeling of 
conviction comes in degrees. The strength of one’s felt conviction about 
one’s inner being increases as one, who is already seized with a yearning 
to give up willing after contemplating the temporal finitude of his 
existence, actually approaches death. Only this way of dying—with a 
felt consciousness of the indestructibility of one’s own inner nature—
counts, for Schopenhauer, as dying “actually” (in other words, 
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“willingly,” “gladly,” and “cheerfully”) and “not merely apparently.” And 
only this way of dying guarantees absolute deliverance from the 
bondages and miseries of worldly life and results in ultimate restoration 
to one’s former or primal state, that is, the in-itself that is beyond all 
representational boundaries and stands in direct opposition to the 
phenomenal world experienced in ordinary states of consciousness.108 
Schopenhauer says,  
Dying is the moment of that liberation from the one-sidedness of an 
individuality which does not constitute the innermost kernel of our 
true being, but is rather to be thought of as a kind of aberration 
thereof. The true original freedom again enters at this moment which 
in the sense stated can be regarded as a “restoration to the former 
state.”109 
Here, a caveat is necessary: Schopenhauer should not be understood as 
expounding a conception of death as a means for supersensuous 
cognition or transcendent perception. As Eduard von Hartmann 
correctly observes, it seems as if he is suggesting the possibility that, 
after death, a higher form of noncognitive consciousness might be 
attributed to the intrinsically noncognitive will, which is in itself without 
knowledge and hence devoid of the subject–object contrast. However, 
for Schopenhauer, every consciousness presupposes a sensibility, 
something determinable, or more specifically, a consciousness of an 
object in opposition to a consciousness of one’s objective self. 
Therefore, Hartman correctly concludes, for Schopenhauer, “a 
consciousness in which this opposition ceases is inconceivable.”110 No 
representation (that is contiguous with our embodied experience), act 
of will, feeling, or awareness persists after death. This means that during 
the process of dying any possibility of knowledge together with its 
correlative form of object and subject entirely vanishes. What is at stake 
here is, then, precisely a felt conviction that one’s true inner being is 
indestructible, but one is never able to fully grasp the true nature of this 
feeling or articulate what this feeling is all about. Schopenhauer speaks 
of “a sure and certain feeling [that] says to everyone that there is in him 
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something positively imperishable and indestructible.”111 “However,” he 
adds, “we [are] not able to see clearly what this imperishable element 
is.”112  Insofar as this feeling has no object, does not differentiate a 
referent, and has no conceptual determination, it leaves us with an 
irresistible yet unjustifiable certitude about the existence of something 
that is prior and external to the phenomenal world. 
However, a question persists: How can feeling in the sense of 
certitude or enhanced conscious awareness be thought of as leading 
into the profoundest metaphysical insight? How can we be so sure that 
feeling is not susceptible to error or illusion? One answer might be that 
feeling is never susceptible to error or illusion, for in feeling we have no 
subject–object distinction and hence no possibility of falsity or error, 
nor any place for knowledge to directly reflect what is experienced. A 
possible objection to this might be that feeling is essentially subjective, 
and what is subjective necessarily accompanies what is objective. Then 
in reply to that, one might point out that feeling is not subjective, in the 
sense of being opposed to or being directed at something objective. 
Rather, feeling is subjective in the sense that it is inextricably bound up 
with our embodied nature. This answer would fit how Fichte 
understands feeling, as the proper point of unification of what is 
subjective and what is objective. For instance, when Fichte speaks of 
our feeling of a drive, longing (Sehnen), “an indeterminate sensation of 
a need” that is “not determined through the concept of an object,” he 
seems to speak of a “wholly immediate” relation that we bear to the 
drive, not of a particular representation of that drive that, as such, 
necessarily assumes the subject–object distinction.113 However, it is not 
clear whether this is the position Schopenhauer leaves us in. 
In his attempt to answer the question of the thing-in-itself in a 
generally Fichtean manner, Schopenhauer at times came close to Kant’s 
stance on the unknowability of the thing-in-itself. However, despite the 
apparent shifts in his thinking, Schopenhauer, till the very end, never 
dropped the claim that the thing-in-itself is the will. But how can we 
make sense of this complicated and ambiguous textual situation of his 
philosophy? It seems that Schopenhauer leaves the contradictions 
simply as they are—but perhaps this is precisely his point. 
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I have argued that Schopenhauer identified the thing-in-itself with 
the will, then later appeared to soften his stance by saying that the will 
is the appearance of the thing-in-itself, and at times simply opposed the 
thing-in-itself to the will and the phenomenal world. How can he hold 
these views simultaneously and see no contradiction? Although his use 
of the term “thing-in-itself” appears irremediably ambiguous, he is quite 
consistent in his characterization of “will.” He often speaks of the will’s 
inner conflict or contradiction with itself (Widerspruch mit sich selbst), 
as expressed by the phenomenon of self-renunciation 
(Selbstverleugnung), in which “the in-itself of its real nature ultimately 
abolishes itself”114 and thus leads us back to the Kantian thing-in-itself, 
“that to which the denial of the will-to-live opens the way.”115 Nature 
expresses itself through a duality of polar opposites, “from the 
particular or the universal, from inside or outside, from the centre or the 
periphery.”116 On the one hand, it has its center in every individual, given 
that each individual manifests the entire will-to-live. On the other, single 
individuals come into and go out of existence; from the periphery, “the 
individual is nothing,” a mere phenomenon, conditioned by time and 
space.117 According to Schopenhauer, “[o]nly he who really knows how 
to reconcile and eliminate this obvious contradiction of nature 
[Widerspruch der Natur] has a true answer to the question concerning 
the perishableness or imperishableness of his own self.”118 This requires 
“looking inward” and thereby recognizing in one’s inner being, “which 
is his will, the thing-in-itself, and hence that which alone is everywhere 
real.”119 If by “will” we understand “that which inevitably contradicts 
itself to the extent of self-annihilation,” then it appears the human will, 
in some fundamental sense, belongs to a nonphenomenal reality that 
transcends time. So as soon as we realize that the will has “non-
existence as its goal,”120 we may be warranted in regarding these three 
formulations of the thing-in-itself as complementary attempts at 
unfolding a single thought. In other words, they appear contradictory, 
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and we may be troubled by the apparent contradiction, but 
Schopenhauer would not be terribly troubled by that. He regards these 
inconsistencies as the natural implication of his theory, for, as he wisely 
remarks in his later years, contradiction “is always the case when the 
transcendent is to be brought into immanent knowledge.”121 
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